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INTRODUCTION

This issue of the VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW contains two
outstanding student pieces on bankruptcy law. Few would be
surprised by this observation. As to the quality of the works, they fall
in with a long tradition of outstanding student scholarship published
by the REVIEW. The choice of topic-bankruptcy law-also does not
raise eyebrows. After all, Congress has recently enacted the most
sweeping changes to the Bankruptcy Code since its original enactment
in 1978. This legislation was the culmination of a more than decadelong effort to revise our nation's bankruptcy law. Any major reform
effort of this scope surely generates puzzles for students to solve. One
would expect that the coming years will see a steady flow of student
work grappling with the changes wrought by the new legislation.
Constitutional issues and interpretative problems have already hit the
courts, and ambitious students looking for challenging legal issues on
which to hone their analytical skills will find much in the new law to
keep them busy.
Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School.
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The surprising feature of the two Notes in this issue, however,
is that they have nothing whatsoever to do with the recent legislation.
To be sure, it is not because they are unimportant matters. The
application of principles of judicial estoppel in bankruptcy proceedings
has caused much consternation in the courts, as Rob Dugas ably
catalogs. The appropriate rate of interest on a "cram down" in Chapter
13, the topic of Matthew O'Brien's contribution, is an issue that
confronts bankruptcy courts every day.
Despite the fact that neither Note wrestles with the new
legislation, each casts light on the legislative process in its own way.
When Congress revisits an area of law, what is left undisturbed is as
much a way of evaluating Congress's performance as is looking at
what was changed. Ideally, when a legislature steps into an area it
limits its reach only to those areas where Congress has an
institutional advantage. For example, much has ink has been spilled
on whether debtors should have to buy their discharge of past debts
with income earned after they file for bankruptcy. The debate here is
fierce, and Congress, as opposed to the courts, is the institution that
should strike the balance. Similarly, the use of various financial
products has become widespread since the original enactment of the
Code, and the new legislation allowed Congress to put in place rules
that set forth how these products are to be treated in bankruptcy.' At
the same time, if there is no desire to shift course or provide guidance
if the courts are not in disarray, Congress should stay its hand.
Legislation is a scarce good. There is an optimal division between
issues that should be left for judicial consideration and issues that
should be resolved at the legislative level.
The record presented by these two Notes is decidedly mixed.
Consider first in this regard Rob Dugas's Note exploring the
application of judicial estoppel in bankruptcy proceedings. Judicial
estoppel is a doctrine that originated outside of bankruptcy law. It
prohibits a party who makes an assertion in one proceeding from
making a contrary assertion in another. Courts, however, have
struggled to translate this doctrine into the bankruptcy forum. The
judicial estoppel issue arises when a debtor files for bankruptcy and
fails to disclose as an asset a lawsuit in which it is the plaintiff. After
the case is closed, the debtor seeks to prosecute that lawsuit. The
defendant then attempts to invoke judicial estoppel so as to dismiss

1.
That Congress enacted special rules here does not necessarily mean that it made the
correct policy choice. See generally Edward R. Morrison & Franklin R. Edwards, Derivatives and
the Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special Treatment?, 22 Yale J. Reg. 91 (2005) (questioning the
economic wisdom behind provisions designed to protect the derivatives markets).
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the suit. The defendant points out that not listing the lawsuit as an
asset in the bankruptcy proceeding is in effect an assertion that the
lawsuit has no value, and the defendant wants to estop the plaintiff
from now asserting otherwise. Courts have struggled in solving this
problem. Dugas articulates the concerns that created the judicial
estoppel doctrine and carefully applies this doctrine to the bankruptcy
setting in a way that ensures that the omissions of the debtor are not
used so as to deprive creditors of the recovery to which they are
entitled.
Dugas's analysis is careful in that it attends to the differences
between individual and corporate debtors as well as the Chapter
under which the debtor has filed. To be sure, one could quickly craft
legislation that captures Dugas's solution. Yet few would fault
Congress for not doing so. The doctrine of judicial estoppel is a
creature of the court. It ig designed to protect the integrity of the
courts. While the judicial development to date has been uneven, courts
are institutionally capable of defining its appropriate scope. Moreover,
the facts that give rise to judicial estoppel occur relatively
infrequently. Hence, there is little to suggest that, even if Congress
could craft an improvement on the current state of affairs, this would
be time well spent.
Of course, few would contend that the congressional decision
not to intervene was the product of considered neglect. A public choice
view of the matter would begin with the observation that it is difficult
to conceive of any interest group that would expend resources to
clarify the law in this area. When a debtor is able to conceal assets
from the bankruptcy court, the loss falls on the unsecured creditors
who would have otherwise enjoyed the value of that asset. To the
extent that debtors routinely omitted lawsuits from their schedules, a
coordinated group of creditors, such as credit card companies, could
push for legislation to curb this practice. However, the game is
probably not worth the candle. While judicial estoppel occurs with
some frequency, it probably does not do so often enough to make it
worth any interest group's time and effort to pursue legislation.
Regardless of why Congress did not intervene here, that it left the
matter to the courts seems to be appropriate.
While one may thus not be surprised to find that Congress did
not wade into the morass of judicial estoppel, its failure to address the
topic of the second Note in this issue creates something of a puzzle.
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to keep an asset in
which it has granted a creditor a security interest over the objection of
that creditor, but only if the debtor promises the creditor "the value,
as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under
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the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount
of such claim. ' 2 Put simply, the debtor can "cram down" a Chapter 13
plan on a dissenting secured creditor so long as the payments
promised to that creditor have a value, measured on the date of the
plan, that is equal to the amount of the creditor's collateral. Because
mortgages are handled by targeted provisions in Chapter 13, the
property for which this is most often an issue is the debtor's car. The
method by which a court is to ascertain the "value" of the payments to
the automotive lender divides the lower courts. In short, courts split
on how to account for the risk that the debtor will default on the
promised payments. The Supreme Court entertained this issue in Till
v. SCS Credit Corporation,3 but did not provide an answer to the
question.
In his Note, O'Brien attempts to provide guidance to lower
courts struggling to deal with the confusion wrought by Till. He
suggests that rather than use either the "formula" approach endorsed
by four justices or the "contract" approach backed by a different four,
courts can use available data to gain some insight as to the interest
rate that would make a secured creditor indifferent to getting the
value of its collateral now or the stream of payments offered by the
debtor. O'Brien examines data available from securitizations of car
loans and the limited evidence on Chapter 13 success rates to attempt
to move beyond the approaches offered to date.
Yet one has to wonder why this miasma was allowed to linger.
It does not take much work to realize that, in the aggregate, a
substantial sum of money turns on the approach chosen to calculate
the default risk. We may not be able to tally the precise amount at
stake, but even a cursory analysis suggests that the stakes here are
far from trivial. In Till itself, the lender and the debtors agreed that
the present value of the car was $4000. The Chapter 13 plan called for
the Tills to pay this off over three years. The Tills put forward a rate
of prime plus 1.5%, or 9.5%. The secured creditor suggested staying
with the rate of interest called for by the contract, which was 21%. In
other words, there was roughly an $800 variance between the
payments suggested by the Tills and those by the lender. 4 To be sure,
we have no information on how many debtors attempt to keep cars in
Chapter 13 or on the extent to which the value of the Tills' car fairly
2.

11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2006).
3.
541 U.S. 465 (2004). For an argument that the Court's failure in this regard represents
a "calamity," see Robert K. Rasmussen, Till v SCS Credit Corporation: The Only Wrong Decision
is Not Making One, 67 Ohio St. L.J. (forthcoming 2006).
4.
The Tills rate yields a monthly payment of $128.13 a month; that pressed by the lender
yields a payment of $150.70 a month. Over the three-year plan period, the difference is $812.52.
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reflects the average value of cars in Chapter 11. 5 Still, with over
400,000 Chapter 13 cases a year, the overall impact of which rate is
chosen seems substantial.
The Supreme Court proved unable to provide meaningful
guidance on the interest rate issue, yet Congress stayed its hand. This
failure to act is all the more troublesome if we assume that Congress
adheres to its decision to give secured lenders in Chapter 13 a stream
of payment equal to the value of their collateral. There is a deep
market for car loans and there have been millions of Chapter 13 cases.
As O'Brien points out, these two sets of information make it possible
to ascertain what rate of interest, as a general matter, will make the
secured lender indifferent to getting the value of its collateral or the
promised payment. While O'Brien has garnered what he could, he
acknowledges his information is by no means perfect. Congress, not
the courts, seems to be the institution better suited for supplying the
missing facts.
The puzzle is heightened by comparing this issue of how to
calculate the cram down rate with an issue that Congress did address
in the new legislation. One recurring issue in Chapter 13 cases over
the years has been how to value automobiles. On this question, the
Supreme Court provided much guidance in its Rash decision where it
held that the Code required the car to be valued with reference to its
replacement value. 6 The Court, however, left open some wiggle room.
It opined that "[a] creditor should not receive portions of the retail
price, if any, that reflect the value of items the debtor does not receive
when he retains his vehicle, items such as warranties, inventory
storage, and reconditioning." Thus, while the Court decided that as
between the value a car would generate at foreclosure and the value
for which the car could be sold at retail, it did leave some ambiguity as
to how the replacement value standard was to be implemented in each
case. Congress eliminated this residual ambiguity in the new
legislation when it mandated that in individual cases under Chapter 7
or 13, the secured creditor's "claim shall be determined based on the
replacement value of such property as of the date of the filing of the
7
petition without deduction for costs of sale or marketing."
The contrast between the cram down rate issue and the
valuation rate issue creates a puzzle. If anything, one would think
that Congress should have resolved the interest rate issue first. The
5.
By way of comparison, the vehicle at issue in Rash was a truck which all parties agreed
had a value in excess of $30,000. Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 957-58
(1997).
6.
See Rash, 520 U.S. at 955-56.
7.
11. U.S.C. 506(a)(2) (2006).
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degree of doctrinal confusion is much greater here than it is in the
valuation area. Moreover, the amount of money affected by the
interest rate issue seems larger than the amount affected by the
valuation issue, at least post-Rash. One could imagine Congress
weighing in on both issues, neither issue, or perhaps only the interest
rate issue. Yet from the perspective of sound institutional policy,
tweaking the valuation standard while leaving the cram down rate
untouched seems irresponsible.
To the extent that one harbors a vision of Congress as
maintaining a steady hand on the progress of its legislation, the
failure to address the interest rate issue gives one pause. Yet a public
choice explanation of the legislature's inaction is only somewhat
satisfactory. As has been well-discussed in the popular press, the
driving force behind much of the recent legislation was the credit card
companies. Credit card companies by and large appear as unsecured
creditors in bankruptcy cases. As such, there is tension between their
interests and those of secured creditors. Debtors, after all, can only
offer a set stream of income. The size of the pie is fixed; what is at
issue is the allocation of the slices. If the Chapter 13 plan allocates
more of the debtor's post-bankruptcy income to the secured creditor,
less can be directed to the unsecured creditors.
Credit card companies thus benefit from a low cram down rate.
Such a rate frees up cash for payments on unsecured debt. The credit
card lobby would therefore seem to be a powerful force for enacting the
formula standard, which is generally lower than the contract
standard. However, there is at least one other interest group for which
such a rate would be anathema. Lenders who make automobile loans
would fare less well under the formula approach. They would support
legislation mandating a higher rate, such as the contract rate
discussed in Till or a rate constructed along the lines suggested by
O'Brien. There is no reason to think that the credit card industry can
steamroll the automotive lending industry, and there is no reason to
think that the automobile lenders can best the credit card lobby. Thus,
one could attribute the congressional inaction here to a stalemate
between powerful interest groups.8
If these opposing interests explain why Congress side-stepped
the interest rate issue, what explains the legislative desire to tilt
settled law in favor of the auto lenders on the valuation front? If there

8.
Of course there is some overlap between these two groups (i.e., some banks issue credit
cards and make automobile loans). Yet it is clearly the case that specialization in the lending
industry is common enough that the development of two very powerful interest groups with
conflicting agendas is hardly a stretch of the imagination.
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is no room for compromise on interest rates, why is there a victory for
the auto lenders on valuing the collateral? One could always posit an
argument that smacks of a "just so" story. The argument would be
that this legislative change was a transfer from the credit card
industry to the auto finance industry in order to have the auto
industry support the legislation.
Such an ad hoc explanation illustrates an aspect of public
choice that some find unsettling. When Congress takes no action, one
can posit either that no group was interested in spending resources to
push for legislation, or that two influential interest groups wanted
inconsistent policies. When Congress does act, however, one can argue
that an interest group was either unopposed or that it was getting a
side payment from another interest group. To be sure, there are
successful predictions as to the outcome of legislative process, but on
the whole, interest-group theory here offers better explanations than
it does predictions.
Regardless of what dynamic was actually at work in the areas
of judicial estoppel and cram down rates, these two Notes demonstrate
the continued value of student work. Both make substantial progress
on problems that escape the attention of Congress and require us to
think hard about the interaction between the courts and the
legislature. Enjoy!

